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Abstract 
We examine ftrms' use of currency derivatives to in order to differentiate among existing theories 
of hedging behavior. Firms with greater growth opportunities and tighter fmancial constraints are 
more likely to use currency derivatives. This result suggests that fnms might use derivatives to 
reduce cash flow variation that might otherwise preclude fnms from investing in valuable growth 
opportunities. Firms with extensive foreign exchange-rate exposure and economies of scale in 
hedging activities are also more likely to use currency derivatives. Finally, the source of foreign 
exchange-rate exposure is an important factor in the choice among types of currency derivatives. 
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Why Firms Use Currency Derivatives 
Large U.S. corporations increasingly turn to derivatives to reduce their exposures to a 
variety of risks. The motives for this behavior are not well understood, and the empirical 
evidence on the characteristics of derivatives users is limited. However, theoretical research 
provides sev eral explanations for optimal hedging that result from different types of capital market 
imperfections. To distinguish among these explanations, we examine the use of currency 
derivatives for a sample of ftrms that have ex ante exposure to foreign exchange-rate risk. We 
also consider how the magnitude of this exposure affects the level of benefits that can be realized 
from reducing risk and the costs associated with risk reduction. 
Our sample represents 372 of the Fortune 500 nonfmancial firms m 1990. All of our 
sample fmns have potential exposure to foreign currency risk from foreign operations, foreign-
denominated debt, or a high concentration of foreign competitors in their industries. 
Approximately 41 percent of these ftrms use currency swaps, forwards, futures, options, or 
combinations of these instruments. We fmd that firms with greater growth opportunities and 
tighter fmancial constraints are more likely to use currency derivatives. This result is consistent 
with the notion that firms use derivatives to reduce the variation in cash flows or earnings that 
might otherwise preclude frrms from investing in valuable growth opportunities (Shapiro and 
Titman (1986), Lessard (1990), Stulz (1990) and Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993)). The 
underinvestment cost explanation for optimal hedging suggests that, contrary to recent media 
hyperbole, derivatives may prov ide a valuable benefit to firms that use them rationally. 
We also examine currency derivatives use for naturally-hedged firms, those with foreign 
operations and foreign-denominated debt For this sample, research and development (R&D) 
expenses and short-term liquidity are not significant determinants of currency derivatives use. 
However, these variables are still significant determinants of derivatives use for frrms with foreign 
operations but no foreign-denominated debt. These results suggest that foreign-denominated debt 
and currency derivatives act as substitutes for hedging foreign operations. 
3 
The likelihood of using currency derivatives also is positively related to foreign pretax 
income and sales, and foreign-denominated debt. These results are consistent with our argument 
that the benefits of hedging are greatest and the costs lowest for firms with extensive foreign 
exchange-rate exposure. Finally, larger firms and firms that use other types of derivative 
instruments, including interest-rate-based and commodity-based derivatives, are more likely to use 
currency derivative instruments, which suggests that economies of scale in costs are important 
determinants of currency derivatives use. 
Because we observe derivativ es use, not "hedging," our dependent variable might measure 
speculation rather than hedging. Therefore, we consider firms' motives in using currency 
derivativ es to speculate and the implications of speculation for our results. Although we fmd that 
some of our proxy variables are important determinants of both optimal speculation and optimal 
hedging (such as fmn size), other frrm characteristics (such as those associated with 
underinvestment costs) are unrelated to optimal speculative motives. Therefore, although 
currency derivatives use is not a direct measure of hedging, our results suggest that on average, 
our sample firms are not speculating with currency deriv ative instruments. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I summarizes this paper's contribution to the 
existing literature on derivatives use. Section II reviews the incentiv es for derivatives use and 
discusses the effects of underlying exposure and costs of risk management on a fmn 's ultimate 
hedging decision. Section III describes our sample and the collection of derivatives data. Section 
IV reports univ ariate and logit tests of the determinants of the use of currency derivatives as well 
as the results of robustness checks on those tests . We test the determinants of the choices among 
types of derivativ e instruments in Section V. Section VI concludes. 
I. Over view ofDeriva tives Use Studies 
Our paper is one of the frrst cross-sectional studies to examme the determinants of 
corporate deriv ativ es use by employing new annual report disclosures required by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board, rather than survey data. We contribute to the empirical literature 
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through our sample construction and empirical methodology. Our sample of Fortune 500 fmns 
with ex ante foreign exchange-rate exposure reduces noise in our empirical tests by excluding 
ftrms that may have incentives to reduce variance, but do not have ex ante exposure. At the same 
time, our sample retains cross-sectional variation in the fmn characteristics that are predicted to 
be associated with optimal hedging. Thus, our results are applicable to a broad range of ftrms. 
Other empirical studies have either used broad but unrestricted samples (Dolde (1993, 1995), 
Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), Mian (1996), and Francis and Stephan (1990)) or industry-
specific samples (Schrand and Unal (1996), and Tufano (1996)). By construction, industry-
specific studies diminish cross-sectional variation in ftrms ' risk exposures, but they do so at the 
expense of cross-sectional variation in the potential incentives to hedge . 
Our empirical tests also include a set of hypotheses that are more comprehensive than 
those of empirical studies that use large cross-sectional samples. We organize the various 
theories into a single framework by discussing the incentives for derivatives use from the 
perspectives of managers, bondholders, and equityholders. With this added structure, we are able 
to identify fmn characteristics that have not been previously considered, and we are able to defme 
our variables to match the testable implications of the theories. In addition, by estimating 
alternative specifications of our empirical models, we address issues of endogeneity related to a 
ftrm's derivatives use, capital structure, and management compensation. While we cannot 
completely eliminate the problem of endogeneity, all our results are nevertheless robust to these 
alternative specifications. 
Finally, unlike other empirical studies, we extend the testable implications of extant 
theories on derivatives use by considering how the cost of using derivatives affects the decision to 
use them. We fmd that fmns with the greatest economies of scale in implementing and 
maintaining a risk management program are more likely to use currency derivatives. Moreover, 
we fmd that the source of underlying exposure to foreign exchange-rate risk affects not only the 
choice to use these derivatives, but also the choice among different types of instruments. For 
example, foreign exchange-rate exposure resulting from foreign operations generally represents 
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frequent short-term transactions in which the payment amount varies across transactions and is 
not determined until the transaction is fmalized. We find that fnms with currency exposure 
resulting from foreign operations or import competition are more likely to use forwards only, or 
forwards in combination with futures or options, than currency swaps. This fmding is consistent 
with the notion that forward contracts and options provide a relatively low-cost method for 
matching the payoffs of frequent and uncertain transactions. 
In contrast, the foreign exchange-rate exposure associated with a foreign debt contract is 
known at the inception of the contract. Thus, the exposure represents a relatively smaller number 
of transactions with multiple, but certain, subsequent payments. Consequently, a fnm can 
implement a single long-term risk management strategy at the initiation of the debt contract. 
Consistent with this argument, we fmd that fnms that use currency swaps or combinations of 
swaps have relatively higher levels of foreign-denominated debt than fnms that use no currency 
derivatives. These results related to the choice of derivative instrument are consistent with 
managers rationally hedging foreign exchange-rate exposure. This behavior, however, is often 
questioned in the current debate over regulation of corporate derivatives use. 
II. Theories ofDerivatives Use 
Theories of optimal hedging demonstrate that capital market imperfections create 
incentives for firms to use derivative instruments. While these imperfections might be necessary 
for optimal derivatives use, they are not sufficient conditions. We argue that given these 
incentives, a firm' s ultimate decision to use derivatives also depends on the level of its exposure to 
foreign exchange-rate risk. In addition, a frrm 's choice to use currency derivatives depends on the 
costs of managing foreign exchange-rate risk. In this section, we propose proxies for the three 
factors affecting a fum 's derivatives decision: the incentives to use derivatives, the exposure to 
foreign exchange-rate risk, and the costs of implementing a derivatives strategy. 
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A. Incentives for derivatives use 
Managers: Smith and Stulz (1985) demonstrate that when a risk-averse manager owns a 
large number of the firm's shares, his expected utility of wealth is significantly affected by the 
variance of the firm 's expected profits. The manager will direct the fum to hedge when he 
believes that it is less costly for the firm to hedge the share price risk than it is for him to hedge 
the risk on his own account. Consequently, Smith and Stulz predict a positive relation between 
managerial wealth invested in the firm and the use of derivativ es. 
We measure the managerial wealth derived from shares by the log of the market value of 
common shares beneficially owned (excluding options) by officers and directors as a group 
(MGRWLTH). Ideally, we would like a proxy which measures the percentage of total managerial 
wealth invested in the fum; however, total managerial wealth is not observed. Using MGRWLTH 
assumes that total managerial wealth is constant across managers in all fums and that the size of 
the management team is constant across all firms. Table I presents the predicted signs of the 
coefficient estimates for each proxy variable. The Appendix contains detailed defmitions and data 
sources for each variable. 
[Insert Table I here] 
The expected utility of managerial wealth can be a convex function of the firm 's expected 
profits when managers own unexercised options. In this case, managers can choose to increase 
the risk of the fum in order to increase the value of their options. Assuming derivativ es are used 
for hedging, Smith and Stulz predict a negative relation between option holdings and derivatives 
use. 
We measure managerial ownership of options (OPTS) by the log of the market value of 
the shares obtainable by using outstanding options. These options are exercisable within 60 days 
of the date for which managerial share ownership is reported in proxy statements. This represents 
a crude proxy for convexity of the compensation function created by employee stock options. 
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However, because we are unable to obtain information about the total number of options 
outstanding, their exercise prices and expiration dates, we cannot determine if the options are in-
or out-of-the-money, or the amount of money at risk. The disincentives related to hedging are 
greatest when the options are out-of-the-money . 
Bondholders: Smith and Stulz (1985) also show that exogenous bankruptcy costs create 
incentives for bondholders to support optimal hedging. By reducing the variance of a fum 's cash 
flows (or accounting profits), hedging decreases the probability, and thus the expected costs, of 
fmancial distress. These exogenous bankruptcy costs can include, for example, the costs related 
to the deterioration or loss of long-term relationships with suppliers and customers (Shapiro and 
Titman, 1986). We use two measures of borrowing capacity as proxies for a firm's pre-hedging 
probability of financial distress: the interest coverage ratio (COV _A V) and the long-term debt 
ratio (DE_ A V). The lower a firm's coverage ratio and the higher its long-term debt ratio, the 
greater the probability of fmancial distress. Consequently, the expected costs of financial distress 
for those firms are greater, assuming that exogenous bankruptcy costs are constant across firms. 
Therefore, the lower a frrm 's coverage ratio and the higher its long-term debt ratio, the more 
likely the firm is to use derivativ es:;eteris paribus2 
The use of the long-term debt ratio as a proxy for expected fmancial distress costs is not 
without controversy. In the interpretation above, we assume that a greater probability of fmancial 
distress leads to greater expected costs. We ignore the possibility that exogenous fmancial 
distress costs might be an important determinant of a fum 's debt choice. For example, a fum with 
high exogenous distress costs might choose a low long-term debt ratio. However, we address this 
issue through extensive robustness checks. For example, we use a firm 's Standard & Poor' s 
credit rating in place of its long-term debt ratio as a measure of expected distress costs. In 
another robustness check, we assume that fums within specific industries have a common 
exposure to distress and replace long-term debt ratios with industry-adjusted ratios. We also 
model the derivatives choice and debt choice simultaneously. The debt choice equation includes 
firm characteristics that control for cross-sectional variation in exogenous financial distress costs. 
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A hedging strategy will only reduce expected bankruptcy costs to the extent that the firm 
can commit ex ante to following a hedging strategy after debt proceeds are received. Such a 
commitment may be achieved directly through bond covenants. Alternatively, bondholders may 
be able to infer that hedging is an optimal fum strategy in equilibrium for reasons unrelated to 
reducing the costs of external financing. At least four of our sample firms disclosed in 1991 that 
bond covenants or credit agreements require them to hedge some portion of their interest rate 
exposure. 
Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) formalize the Smith and Stulz fmancial distress 
explanation for optimal hedging by endogenizing bankruptcy costs. Like Shapiro and Titman 
(1986), Lessard (1990), and Stulz (1990), Froot et al. argue that without hedging, firms are more 
likely to pursue suboptimal investment projects (Myers, 1977). Hedging mitigates this 
underinvestment problem by reducing not only the costs of obtaining external funds, but also a 
firm's dependence on external fmancing. Therefore, we predict a positive association between 
potential underinvestment costs and the benefits of hedging. 
We use three variables as proxies for the growth opportunities available to a firm: RD is 
the ratio of a firm's research and development expenditures to its sales; PPE is the ratio of a firm's 
capital expenditures for property, plant, and equipment to firm size (SIZE), measured as the book 
values of the fum 's debt and outstanding preferred stock plus the market value of the firm's equity; 
and BM is the book value of a fum's common equity scaled by its market value. The 
underinvestment cost hypothesis, however, predicts that these costs result from the interaction of 
both potential growth opportunities and costly external financing. Thus, we create three 
additional variables to measure underinvestment costs by interacting a firm's long-term debt ratio 
multiplicatively with the three proxies for growth opportunities: RD, 1/BM, and PPE. We use the 
inverse of a firm's book-to-market ratio (BM) so that there is a positive predicted relation 
between each of these variables and deriv atives activ ity. 
Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993) argue that fums can control the agency and expected 
fmancial distress costs associated with long-term financing not only by hedging, but also by 
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issuing convertible debt (CONV) or preferred stock (PS). Because CONV and PS are possible 
substitutes for hedging, Nance et al. predict negative relations between derivatives use and these 
debt instruments. In contrast to this prediction, we (indirectly) predict a positive relation between 
derivatives use and both CONV and PS. We base our prediction on the Froot et al. argument that 
firms that are more financially constrained are exposed to greater underinvestment costs. This 
prediction assumes that preferred stock and convertible debt reflect additional leverage, which 
constrains a firm's access to external funds. 
Nance et al. also argue that fmns can reduce the expected financial distress and agency 
costs associated with long-term debt by maintaining greater short-term liquidity. We use two 
variables as proxies for a fum 's short-term liquidity: the quick ratio, which is cash and short-term 
investments divided by current liabilities (QillCK _A V); and the dividend payout ratio (DIV _A V). 
The quick ratio, a variant of the current ratio, measures a firm's ability to repay short-term 
operating liabilities with readily available cash. The numerator of the quick ratio differs from that 
of the current ratio by including only cash and marketable securities, rather than all short-term 
assets. Because converting certain short-term assets, such as inventories or accounts receivable, 
to cash can create information costs similar to those related to debt fmancing, the quick ratio can 
capture the concept of internal wealth used in Froot et al. better than the current ratio. The 
greater a firm's quick ratio and the lower its dividend payout ratio, the lower its need to hedge to 
reduce the expected financial distress and agency costs of straight debt. Froot et al. also predict a 
negative association between liquidity and hedging. This prediction results from interpreting 
liquidity not as a substitute for long-term debt, but as a measure of the availability of internal 
funds. 
Equitylwlders: Smith and Stulz (1985) demonstrate that hedging increases the expected 
value of an equityholder's ownership claim when a progressive statutory corporate tax schedule 
creates concavities in a frrm's expected profit function. Tax preference items such as tax credits, 
which are subtracted from pretax income, indirectly create convexity in the tax liability (concavity 
in firm value), because the present value of unused preference items decreases as they are carried 
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forward to future periods. Reducing variance through hedging increases the expected value of tax 
benefits because the probability of using preference items increases with the level of a fum's 
taxable income. We measure the availability of tax preference items using the book value of net 
operating losscarryforwards outstanding scaled by total assets (NOL\ 
Two additional proxies for tax incentives were considered by Nance, Smith, and Smithson 
(1993). However, these proxies are not used in this paper because our sample period follows the 
Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986. Their frrst proxy measures a firm's probability of facing 
progressive tax rates. Because rate changes regulated by TRA induce volatility in the time series 
of tax expense, the Nance et al. metric might overstate management's expectations of the firm 's 
probability of operating in the progressive tax region.4 Their second proxy measures the 
availability of tax preference items by using available investment tax credits (ITCs ). TRA 
generally repealed ITCs (Code Section 49). Consequently, we use only net operating loss 
carryforwards as a proxy for tax incentives. 
DeMarzo and Duffie ( 1991) argue that equityholders can benefit from hedging when 
managers have private information about an unobservable risk that affects the fum's payoffs. In 
their model, hedging gives uninformed equityholders reduced noise in their information sets 
concerning the variability of a firm's payoffs because hedging reduces their variance. 
Equityholders support hedging because they can make better optimal portfolio optimization 
decisions. DeMarzo and Duffie's model suggests that equityholders of fums with greater 
informational asymmetry will derive greater benefits if the firm hedges. 
We use two proxy variables to measure information asymmetry : the percentage of 
institutional ownership of the sample fum (IO), and the number of investment frrms with analysts 
following the sample frrm (ANLST). We assume that a larger analyst following and a greater 
number of institutional investors are positively related to the availability of information, and thus 
negatively related to the probability of hedging. 
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B. Variation and Exposure 
Firms with greater variation in cash flows or accounting earnings resulting from exposure 
to foreign exchange-rate risk have greater potential benefits of using currency derivatives. We 
measure this variation related to operating activities using the absolute value of the ratio of pretax 
foreign net income to total sales (FORINC).5 The higher a fmn's foreign pretax income, the 
greater the benefits from hedging. Income represents the net of foreign-denominated revenues, 
and also the direct and indirect expenses, which may be foreign-denominated, related to foreign 
operations. To the extent that costs are a natural hedge of foreign revenues, net profit represents 
the underlying exposure to foreign currency risk. But because this measure can also include 
allocated domestic expenses, we additionally measure exposure to foreign exchange-rate risk by 
using the ratio of foreign sales to total sales (FORSALES) and the ratio of foreign assets to total 
assets (FORASSETS)~ 
Foreign-denominated debt can also act as a natural hedge of foreign revenues, thereby 
decreasing a fmn's foreign exchange-rate exposure. On the other hand, foreign debt can increase 
a firm's exposure to foreign exchange-rate risk if debt-related cash outflows and net foreign-
denominated cash inflows are negatively correlated. Because this correlation cannot be 
determined from publicly available data, we cannot predict the relation between foreign debt and 
derivatives use. We measure the exposure of a firm's debt to foreign exchange-rate risk by the 
dollar equivalent amount of foreign-denominated long- and short-term debt (L TFRDT and 
STFRDT). We also use an indicator variable equal to one (FORDEBT) if the fmn has 
quantifiable foreign-denominated long- or short-term debt, or makes a qualitative, but not 
quantitative, disclosure about the existence of foreign-denominated debt. 
Finally, variation in a frrm's short-term cash flows is related to changes in exchange rates 
when foreign competitors can affect market prices, and thus demand for domestic output. We 
measure this competitive exposure by using the percentage of imports in a firm's four-digit SIC 
industry relative to total industry output (HvlPORTS). As the percentage of imports increases, 
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changes in the value of the dollar versus other currencies become a more significant factor in 
demand for domestic output. 
C. Costs 
Costs also play a role in a fmn's decision to use currency derivatives and in its choice 
among derivatives strategies. We consider two major components of these costs: those 
associated with initiating and maintaining a risk management program m general, and those 
associated with choosing a particular currency derivative instrument. If the costs are high 
enough, a firm will not use any derivatives. If the costs are low enough, they can still affect a 
firm's choice among instruments. 
Costs associated with implementing and maintaining a risk management program, 
including those related to the acquisition of expertise, exhibit economies of scale related to the 
amount of risk managed. Two variables previously introduced to measure variation, pretax 
foreign income (FORINC) and foreign-denominated debt (FORDEBT), are also proxies for 
economies of scale. Because these proxies are negatively correlated with the costs of 
implementing a derivative strategy and positively related to the benefits, we predict a positive 
association with derivatives use for both of these v ariables. 
Another measure of economies of scale is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm uses 
other types of derivatives (OTHDERIV) in addition to currency-based derivatives. Firms that use 
other types of derivatives can have greater expertise and lower transaction costs associated with 
derivatives trading. Therefore, we predict a positive association between OTHDERIV and the 
use of currency derivatives. 
Finally, fmn size (SIZE) is a proxy for economies of scale in the costs of hedging. As 
discussed in Nance et al., there are alternative arguments for either a positive or negative relation 
between fmn size and hedging activity. For example, smaller fmns should hedge more, ceteris 
p aribus, because of the inverse relation between firm size and bankruptcy costs (Warner, 1977). 
We might also expect a negative relation between frrm size and the use of derivatives if smaller 
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ftrms have greater information asymmetries. O'Brien and Bhushan (1990) document that analyst 
following and institutional ownership, which proxy for information asymmetry, are positively and 
negatively related to ftrm size, respectively, in a multivariate setting. Ultimately, the predicted 
sign of the estimated coefficient on SIZE is ambiguous. 
If a frrm chooses to implement a risk management program, it also must consider the costs 
associated with particular instrument choices. These costs include liquidity costs, transactions 
costs of customization, and basis risk. Liquidity and transaction costs are greater for customized 
and long-term contracts, but customization reduces basis risk. We ignore costs associated with 
counterparty default risk, because almost all of our sample frrms use ov er-the-counter currency 
derivatives. 
Operating exposures generally represent a series of transactions with a subsequent single 
payment, for example, sales or payments on credit. In contrast, debt exposures generally 
represent a single or small number of transactions with multiple but certain subsequent payments. 
Therefore, foreign-debt exposure over the life of the debt contract is known at the inception of 
the contract. Thus, frrms can implement a long-term risk-management strategy with low basis risk 
at the inception of the debt contract. Operating exposure, however, needs to be managed 
dynamically to minimize costs associated with basis risk. 
Forward contracts provide a relatively low-cost method for matching the payoffs of 
frequent and uncertain transactions. The downside to using forwards is the basis risk associated 
with differences between characteristics of the underlying transaction and the forward contract, 
such as the maturity or payoff date. Basis risk for operating transactions is relatively small, 
however, because each individual transaction is of a short-term nature. 
Over-the-counter swap contracts are more cost-effective for the risks associated with 
longer-term debt contracts because these instruments can be customized to reduce basis risk 
associated with generic forward contracts. In addition, because there are ftxed costs associated 
with each contract, the cost of customization is relatively lower for a single long-term contract 
than for a portfolio of short-term contracts with comparable maturity . 
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III. Sample Companies and Derivative Instrument Activity 
We construct our sample of industrial firms from Fortune's 1991 list of the 500 U.S. 
industrial corporations with the highest sales for fiscal year 1990. Of the Fortune 500 fmns, we 
eliminate cooperatives (13), subsidiaries of foreign owned corporations (13), private companies 
(44), firms acquired during fiscal year 1991 (8), fmns operating under Chapter 11 during the 
sample period (8), and fmns not included on the Compustat tapes (3). Four hundred eleven firms 
rem am. 
We further restrict the sample to those fmns with foreign exchange-rate exposure at year-
end 1990. By eliminating firms with no exposure, we are able to concentrate on the major cross-
sectional differences that affect the incentives for hedging. Measuring foreign exchange-rate 
exposure, however, is difficult. We consider that all of the following are indications of foreign 
exchange-rate exposure: reporting pretax foreign income (311 fmns ), foreign sales (282 firms), 
non-zero long- or short-term foreign-denominated debt ( 120 and 57 firms, respectively), or non-
zero foreign tax expense (342 firms); discussing (qualitatively) foreign operations in the annual 
report footnotes (67 firms); or belonging to a four-digit SIC industry in the upper quartile of the 
411 sample firms with respect to IMPORTS (103). 
Our fmal sample contains 3 72 firms that have at least one source of foreign exchange-rate 
exposure. None of the 39 frrms eliminated by our restrictions use currency derivatives. We also 
examine partitions of this sample based on exposures to various sources of exchange-rate risk. 
The results are only reported in the cases where significant differences exist. 
We obtain data about the use of currency swaps, forwards, futures, and options by reading 
accounting footnotes to annual reports and/or 10-K filings for fiscal year-end 1991. We use a 
dichotomous measure of derivatives use because the reported information about the magnitude of 
off-balance sheet activities is either inconsistent or missing. Although notional amounts are 
available for some firms, our sample size would be greatly reduced if we were to restrict our 
sample to only those frrms with a continuous measure of derivatives activity. More importantly, 
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we do not use notional amounts as a measure of exposure because the annual report disclosures 
are noisy, often because of aggregation and netting. 
[Insert Table II here] 
Table II presents a summary of currency derivatives use by the sample firms, partitioned 
on the basis of firm size and industry. The frequency of currency derivatives use increases across 
the last three size quartiles. It nearly doubles from the third to fourth quartiles (see Table II, 
Panel A). Because we restrict our sample to firms with foreign exchange-rate exposure, the 
reported frequencies are higher than those reported in surveys of random firms (Wharton/Chase 
Survey, 1994). As Panel B shows, firms in the consumer goods and electronics industries are the 
most frequent users of foreign currency derivatives. The differences in derivatives use across 
industries may reflect industry-specific characteristics associated with either increased overseas 
foreign exchange-rate exposure or incentives for optimal risk reduction. Because of the observed 
differences across industries, we include industry indicator variables in our analysis. 
IV. Determinants of Corporate Users of Currency Derivatives 
A. Univariate Tests 
Table III presents summary statistics for the proxy variables described in the previous 
sections, and tests of differences between the means of these variables for users and non-users of 
currency derivatives. User fnms are statistically different from non-user firms with respect to 
variables that are proxies for investment growth opportunities. User frrms have significantly 
greater ratios of research and development expenditures to sales, and smaller book-to-market 
ratios (BM), than do non-users of derivatives. In addition, currency derivatives users' quick 
ratios (QUICK_ A V) are statistically lower than those of non-users. This suggests that these two 
groups differ with respect to proxies for short-term liquidity. Currency derivatives users also 
have larger managerial option holdings than do non-users. Finally, non-users exhibit less 
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informational asymmetry than do users, as measured by institutional ownership or analyst 
following. 
[Insert Table III here] 
The univariate tests suggest that users of currency derivatives are not statistically different 
from non-users with respect to managerial wealth, substitutes for hedging, or tax preference 
items. The univariate results related to the proxies for financial distress are mixed. Although the 
long-term debt ratios of users of currency derivatives are statistically lower than those of non-
users, the interest coverage ratios of the two groups are not statistically different. When we 
analyze firms that have foreign operations but no foreign denominated debt (results not 
presented), users have larger managerial shareholdings. This result is consistent with the industry-
specific hedging studies in which much of the cross-sectional variation in underlying exposure is 
eliminated by construction (Schrand and Una~ 1996, and Tufano, 1996). However, as we note in 
the next section, managerial wealth is not statistically significant in logit regressions for this 
sample. 
In addition to cross-sectional differences in hedging incentiv es, currency derivatives users 
and non-users also differ on the costs of implementing a derivatives strategy. On average, user 
firms are significantly larger than non-user firms, with mean (logged) capitalizations of $8.24 
million and $7.13 million, respectively. User rums also have greater exposure to foreign 
exchange-rate risk, as measured by foreign pretax income, foreign sales, foreign-denominated 
debt, and IMPORTS. Finally, the ratio of foreign to total assets (FORASSETS) is not 
significantly different across users and non-users. This observation is consistent with the results 
of the Wharton/Chase survey (1995) of derivatives users in which only 4.7 percent of the 
respondents indicate that their firms hedge balance sheet ratios. The remainder of the respondents 
indicate that their fnms hedge cash flows or accounting earnings that are associated with foreign 
income, sales, or debt. 
17 
B. Logit Results 
We estimate logit regresstons to distinguish among the possible explanations for 
derivatives use. Table IV presents the results of logit regressions of a dichotomous variable 
representing deriv atives use on the explanatory variables and industry indicator v ariables. The 
dependent v ariable is equal to one for currency derivatives users and zero for non-users. Because 
multiple proxies are available to measure some frrm characteristics (such as the coverage and the 
long-term debt ratios as measures of financial distress) we estimate separate logit regressions, 
using all possible combinations of variables representing each predicted construct. The results are 
qualitatively similar. 
[Insert Table IV here] 
Table IV reports marginal changes m the probability of using derivative instruments, 
implied by the logit coefficient estimates, that result from a unit change in the explanatory 
variables. These marginal sensitivities are labeled .t1Prob. In the discussion below, we focus on 
these marginal effects. 
We present the results for two sets of logit regressions. The first regression uses book-to-
market ratios (BM ) as proxies for growth opportunities. Of the 372 sample firms, there are 282 
frrms with available data (full sample). The second regression substitutes research and 
development expenditures for BM . These data are available for 220 frrms (partial sample). For 
the full sample, the estimated model predicts 75 percent of the observations correctly, with 29 
percent and 21 percent of derivatives users and non-users, respectiv ely, misclassified. In the 
sample that includes RD, 78 percent of the observations are predicted correctly, with 21 percent 
and 24 percent of deriv atives users and non-users, respective~isclassified. 
As Table IV reports, fmancing constraints provide incentives for hedging. Specifically, 
higher quick ratios, which indicate more internally available funds, imply a significantly lower 
18 
probability of using currency derivative instruments. This result is consistent with the Froot et al. 
prediction that hedging activity is useful to secure the availability of internal funds. It also 
supports the Nance et al. prediction that using substitutes for straight debt can reduce a ftnn's 
relative need to hedge because the agency costs of straight debt are lower. 
The results also suggest that potential underinvestment costs provide incentives for 
hedging. A one percent increase in the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales yields a statistically 
significant increase of 6.98 percent in the probability that a fmn uses currency derivatives. One 
possible explanation for the significance ofRD is given by Lewent and Kearney (1990), who note 
that long-term R&D projects force fmns to seek overseas revenues because domestic R&D 
fmancing can be costly. Because R&D is usually centralized, the firm faces a mismatch between 
domestic costs and foreign revenues. According to Lewent and Kearney, it is this mismatch that 
motivates the hedging activity to insure that internal funds are available for continued investment. 
Additionally, the interaction of the inverse of BM and a firm's long-term debt ratio 
(DE_ A V* 1/BM) is statistically significant and positive. This result suggests that the incentive to 
use derivatives to reduce underinvestment costs is greater when a fum's external financial 
flexibility is lower. 
The results related to underinvestment costs depend to some extent on the source of 
foreign exchange-rate risk. In particular, for firms with foreign operations and foreign-
denominated debt (naturally-hedged fmns), R&D expenses and short-term liquidity are not 
significant determinants of currency derivatives use (logit results are not presented). In contrast, 
R&D expenses and short-term liquidity are still significant in logit regressions for fmns with only 
foreign operations but no foreign-denominated debt. These results suggest that foreign-
denominated debt and currency derivatives may act as substitutes for hedging foreign operatibns. 
Exposure to foreign exchange-rate risk is also an important factor in the decision to use 
derivatives. As predicted in Section II, derivatives use is positively associated with a fmn 's level 
of foreign pretax income, its use of foreign-denominated debt, and the percentage of imports 
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relativ e to total industry sales. These results are significant even after we control for fmn size and 
other potential measures oftnultinationality. 
Finally, the costs associated with implementing a derivatives strategy also play a role in a 
firm's decision to use currency derivatives. Assuming that the use of other types of derivatives 
(OTHDERIV) and (the log of) firm size (SIZE) are proxies for economies of scale, the observed 
positive coefficients suggest the presence of cost-driv en motives for hedging. 
The logit results do not support DeMarzo and Duffie's (1991) information asymmetry 
explanation for hedging, as evidenced by the positive coefficient on the standardized number of 
analyst fmns. 10 An explanation consistent with this result is that managers of fmns with a larger 
analyst following could face more pressure on their quarterly performance, and thus prefer fewer 
earnings surprises. If this is true, we would expect these fmns to hedge more than fmns with 
lower analyst following. But the causality could go the other way. Analysts could choose to 
follow firms with more stable cash flows and fewer earnings surpriJes. 
[Insert Table V here] 
In addition, the results do not support Smith and Stulz' (1985) tax or managerial 
contracting cost explanations for corporate hedging. The coefficient estimates of our proxies for 
managerial contracting costs in the logit regressions (MGRWLTH and standardized OPTS), are 
not statistically significant. 
C Robustness 
Our logit tests can be criticized because some of the independent variables that measure 
potential incentives for derivatives use are, themselv es, choice variables. The long-term debt ratio 
and the management compensation variables create the most concern because choices about 
capital structure and managerial compensation can be made simultaneously with the decision to 
use derivative instruments.12 Moreover, the endogeneity of the managerial compensation choice 
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and the derivatives decision can depend on the firm's level of financial distress.13 Although we 
recognize that it is almost impossible to eliminate these endogeneity issues, we have investigated 
several alternative variable specifications to mitigate this problem, and have provided robustness 
checks of our empirical results14. In all the cases discussed below, our conclusions are unaffected 
by the alternative specifications and procedures. 
To control for possible endogeneity in any of our independent v ariables, we measure all of 
them as of fiscal year-end 1990 but measure the choice of derivatives use as of fiscal year-end 
1991. In the results presented in Table IV, the stock variables, such as the book-to-market and 
long-term debt ratios, are measured as of fiscal year-end 1990. The flow variables, such as 
research and dev elopment expenditures and foreign income, are measured contemporaneously 
with the sample year. Measuring all variables as of fiscal year-end 1990 does not affect the 
results. This robustness check, however, is not completely satisfactory if serial dependence exists 
in these variables . 
To further control for the simultaneity ofthe capital structure and currency derivatives use 
decisions, we estimate the determinants of these decisions simultaneously with a two-stage 
estimation technique (Maddala, 1983). There is no theoretical model explaining a fmn's joint 
choice of its capital structure and currency derivatives use. Therefore, we specify the model of 
the capital structure decision following Titman and Wessels (1988) and Opler and Titman 
(1996).15 Because the capital structure decision equation includes RD, the model of the currency 
derivativ es use decision follows the specification shown in Table IV that includes RD. The 
structural equations are: 
Capital structure decision: 
DE_ A V = o0 + o1CURDERIV * +o2 RD + o3 L OG ( SALES ) + o4 SGA + o5 TANGS 
78 
+ L o1 IND 1 + t: 
1 =1 
( 1) 
Currency derivatives use decision: 
CURDERIV = ~NOL+ ~DE _AV *+ll:JRD + ?..4 RD* (DE _AV *)+ ~QUICK 
+ -\,ANLST- STAND + ~SIZE + AsFORINC+ ~FORDEBT 
7 




In equation (1), CURDERIV* is the predicted value of currency derivatives use obtained 
from the first-stage estimation of the currency derivatives use decision equation; LOG( SALES) is 
the natural logarithm of sales during the sample year~ SGA is the ratio of selling, general and 
administrative expenses to sales; TANGS is the three-year average of the ratio of tangible assets 
(total assets less intangible assets from Compustat) to total assets; and IND 1 through IND77 are 
indicator variables representing 4-digit SIC classifications. In equation (2), DE_ AV* is the 
predicted value of the long-term debt ratio obtained from the first-stage estimation of the capital 
structure decision equation, and INDCLASS represents the seven industry classifications that 
were used in the Table IV regresswns. As in the logit regressions, OPTS and ANLST are 
standardized 
The parameter estimates and their significance levels for the capital structure decision 
equation are similar to those presented in Opler and Titman (1996). The results of these 
regressions (not reported) show that the coefficient estimate on the predicted probability of using 
currency derivativ es is not statistically different from zero. This result suggests that there is no 
clear association between the decision to use currency derivatives and capital structure choice. 
More importantly, the predicted long-term debt ratio is not a statistically significant determinant 
of the decision to use currency deriv atives. However, the interaction variable of RD and 
DE_ A V* is statistically significant, similar to the results presented in Table IV. Additionally, the 
coefficient estimates for the other explanatory variables in equation (2) are similar to those 
reported in Table IV . The parameter estimates for the capital structure decision equation are 
robust to exclusion of the industry indicator variables. 
In addition to this simultaneous equations approach, we also estimate several variants of 
the Table IV logit regressions to address the problem of endogeneity of a firm 's capital structure, 
22 
represented by the long-term debt ratio. First, we reestimate the logit regressions, excluding the 
long-term debt ratio but including the interaction variable that measures the combination of both 
financial distress and growth opportunities. The results for this logit specification are virtually 
unchanged from those presented in Table IV. Therefore, the long-term debt ratio is not driving 
the results. 
Second, we use Standard & Poor's credit ratings as a proxy for fmancial distress instead of 
firms' long-term debt ratios. An advantage of doing this is that credit ratings are less of a 
managerial choice variable than capital structure because they are assigned by a third party. A 
disadvantage of using credit ratings is that they are ordinal measures, and therefore less 
informative than a continuous variable. S&P credit ratings are obtained from Compustat and the 
S&P Bond Guides, and are assigned values from three to 22 for AAA + to D-rated firms, 
respectively. Ratings are available for 258 of the 372 sample firms. The ratings series has a 
correlation of 57.7 percent with long-term debt ratios and -24.7 percent with interest coverage 
ratios. We reestimate the Table IV logit regressions, substituting for the long-term debt ratio 
three indicator variables that represent fnms rated AA- or better (56 firms), A- to A+ (83 fnms), 
and BBB- to BBB+ (72 fnms). Firms below investment grade (47 fnms) serve as the control 
group. None of the coefficients on these indicator variables are significant. The estimates of the 
other coefficients in the regressions do not change for either the full or partial sample. 
Next, we include an industry-adjusted long-term debt ratio as a proxy for financial distress 
instead of the actual long-term debt ratio. We calculate the industry-adjusted ratio as the 
difference between the frrm's long-term debt ratio and the median long-term debt ratio for the 
fum's four-digit SIC industry. By doing this, we assume that the industry median is the frrm's 
target long-term debt ratio, and that any excess or shortfall relative to this median represents a 
measure of fmancial distress. As with the use of S&P credit ratings, our logit results are 
unchanged by this substitution, and the coefficient estimate for the industry-adjusted variable is 
insignificant. 
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To control for the potential endogeneity of the managerial compensation structure, we 
industry-adjust the managerial wealth and managerial option ownership variables. Just as we 
industry-adjusted the long-term debt ratio, we calculate the difference between the log of 
managerial wealth and the median for the industry, and the log of the market value of shares 
obtainable with options and its industry median. We define the industries for these variables based 
on the eight industry groupings presented in Table II, which are derived from the Fortune industry 
codes. Using the industry-adjusted compensation variables instead of MGRWLTH and 
standardized OPTS in the regressions shown in Table IV does not change the results for the 
existing variables. The coefficients are insignificant for both of these industry-adjusted 
compensation variables. 
Finally, we examine the incremental impact of financial distress on derivatives choice for 
firms whose managers have high levels of wealth. To do this, we interact the long-term debt ratio 
with an indicator variable equal to one for those firms with managerial wealth in the upper quartile 
of the sample. We include this interaction variable as well as the long-term debt ratio in the logit 
regressions presented in Table IV. The marginal probability of the interaction variable measures 
whether, conditional on the fum's level of fmancial distress, managerial wealth affects the 
derivatives decision. We separately measure a similar interaction variable for option ownership. 
The coefficient estimates for these interaction variables are insignificant for both samples, and 
their inclusion in the models does not change the existing results. 
D. Hedging versus Speculating 
The consistency of our results with models of optimal hedging behavior suggests that 
firms, on average, are not speculating with currency derivatives. If the motives for optimal 
hedging and speculation are correlated, however, our results might not distinguish between these 
two activities. In this section, we consider fums' motives for speculation and their implications 
for our results. 
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Equityholders are likely to support the use of currency derivatives for speculation if 
speculation is a profit-making activity, if equity shares are viewed as options on the value of a 
levered fum, or if managers of low-output fums want to create noise to mimic high-output fums 
(Ljungqvist, 1994). For speculation to be a profit-making activity in rational markets, either a 
firm must have an information advantage related to the prices of the instruments underlying the 
derivatives, or it must have economies of scale in transactions costs allowing for profitable 
arbitrage opportunities. This suggests that firm size (SIZE) and the use of other derivativ es 
(OTHDERIV) are possible determinants of the use of currency derivatives for speculation. 
If equityholders view their shares as options on the value of a levered fum, we would 
expect them to support any speculation that increases firm volatility when the fum is close to (or 
in) fmancial distress so that the option is near-the-money (or out-of-the-money). Managerial 
option holdings similarly provide incentives for speculation. Therefore, results that are related to 
the association between currency derivatives use and variables that measure fmancial distress will 
also measure the potential motiv es oiquityholders to speculate. 
Finally, in a signaling framework, Ljungqvist (1994) argues that managers of low-output 
firms will speculate to create noise so that their output mimics that of high-output fums. He 
assumes that speculation is an unobservable fair gamble with expected profits equal to zero 
(including no transactions costs), and that there is no penalty for incurring a negative outcome 
from the speculative activity. If we assume that low expected output implies fmancial distress, 
then the model suggests that fums near bankruptcy hav e greater incentives to speculate and delay 
the resolution of uncertainty. This result, however, relies heavily on the assumption that 
speculation is unobservable. This assumption is unnatural given increased monitoring by outside 
debtholders as firms near bankruptcy. 
Overall, the univariate and logit results of the previous sections do not support speculative 
motives for derivatives use. Firm size and the use of other derivatives are positively related to the 
likelihood of using currency derivatives. However, our measures for variation in cash flow or 
accounting earnings that result from exchange-rate exposure are also significant. Additionally, 
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our proxies for fmancial distress are not significantly related to the likelihood of using currency 
derivativ es. Finally, of the 39 fnms that we dropped from our sample because they had no ex ante 
foreign exchange-rate risk exposure, none disclosed using currency derivatives. Because the use 
of currency derivatives by these firms could have suggested speculation, this observation is further 
ev idence against widespread speculation in currency derivatives by our sample firms. 
V. The Choice among Types of Currency Derivatives 
In this section, we examine how fums ' choices among types of derivatives are associated 
with various sources of exposure to exchange-rate risk. As previously discussed in Section II.C, 
this link derives from differences in the costs of using particular instruments to manage specific 
sources of foreign exchange-rate exposure. For example, fums might choose to use long-term 
customized currency swaps to manage foreign exchange-rate exposures which extend over 
multiple periods but are predetermined (e.g. foreign-denominated debt payments). This derivative 
strategy might be the lower cost alternative because it results in a lower level of basis risk than the 
choice of using a series of short-term forward contracts. In contrast, short-term forwards might 
be the lower cost alternative for frequent short-term transactions which are characterized by 
uncertainty about their timing and quantities (e.g. foreign-denominated sales on account). 
In our analysis, we partition the sample based on firms ' derivative instrument choices. For 
each choice we examine fums ' sources of foreign exchange-rate exposure. We divide the sample 
into three groups. The first group includes all firms that do not use currency derivatives. The 
second group includes all fums that use either currency swaps only or currency swaps in 
combination with other currency derivativ es. The third group includes all fums that use only 
foreign exchange forwards or forwards in combination with futures contracts or options. These 
groups are designed to distinguish among fums based on the costs associated with these three 
derivativ es choices. This division also allows a workable number of observations for the most 
important kinds of instrument choices available to currency derivatives users. 
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[Insert Table VI here] 
Table VI shows the frequency of use of currency derivative instruments by type. We 
include this table as a benclunark for analyzing derivative instrument choices in a multivariate 
setting. As previously reported, less than half of the sample fums report using currency 
derivatives. Of those fums that do disclose using currency derivatives, the most frequently used 
instruments are forwards only or forwards in combination with futures or options. As Panel A 
reports, 29.3 percent of the frrms report using forwards and forward combinations, while only 
12.1 percent report using currency swaps either alone or in combination with other currency 
deriv atives. 
The remammg results in Table VI document a positive relation between specific 
derivativ es strategies and a fum 's underlying foreign exchange exposure. These results offer 
further support that our sample fums use derivatives to hedge rather than to speculate. Panel B 
presents the means of various measures of exposure to foreign exchange-rate risk by the type of 
currency derivatives used. The estimates indicate that both swaps users and forwards users have 
significantly higher foreign income and sales than fums that do not use currency derivative 
instruments. However, this measure of foreign exchange-rate exposure is not significantly 
different across firms that use swaps or forwards. 
The other sources of exposure are significantly associated with only one type of 
derivatives use but not with both. For example, frrms that use swaps only or swap combinations 
have statistically higher levels of long-term foreign-denominated debt than firms that use no 
currency derivatives. Forwards users, however, do not have statistically higher levels of foreign-
denominated debt than non-users of currency derivatives. In addition, fums that use forwards 
only or forwards in combination with futures and options have higher foreign exchange-rate 
exposure from import competition than firms that do not use currency derivatives. 
We use a multinomial logit (MNL) model to examine fums' choices among the three 
currency derivative categories (presented in Table VI) in a multivariate setting. The results are 
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presented in Table VII. The model is normalized with respect to the choice of using no currency 
derivative instruments. The independent variables are identical to those presented in Table IV for 
the partial sample, except that we use continuous measures of long- and short-term foreign-
denominated debt and do not include industry dummies due to the limited number of observations 
for the choices.16 We include these continuous debt measures because we are focusing on the 
costs associated with various derivative strategies relative to a firm's underlying foreign 
ex change-rate exposure. 
[Insert Table VII here] 
Table VII reports the marginal probabilities of choosing a particular derivative instrument 
combination implied by the multinomial logit coefficient estimates (also reported in Table VII). 
These marginal sensitiv ities are labeledProb. 
The MNL results in Table VII provide mixed ev idence on whether the source of 
underlying exposure to foreign exchange-rate risk affects the choice among types of currency 
derivatives. Firms with higher levels of operating and competitive exposure, as measured by 
pretax foreign income (FORINC) and the percentage of imports relative to total industry sales 
(IMPORTS), are more likely to choose both classes of currency derivatives. As Table VII 
reports, the marginal probabilities associated with FORINC and HvfPORTS for using forward 
combinations, however, are about three times those for swap combinations (significantly different 
at the 2 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively). This suggests that firms with operating or 
competitive foreign exchange-rate exposure are more likely to use either forwards only, or 
forwards in combination with futures or options, than swaps. 
In contrast, foreign exchange-rate exposure associated with foreign-denominated debt is 
not a significant determinant of a fum's choice among types of currency derivatives. As Table 
VII reports, neither long- nor short-term foreign-denominated debt are statistically significant 
determinants of either currency derivatives choice. Although not reported, we also obtain similar 
results if we substitute the indicator variable used in Table IV, which is equal to unity if a fum 
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discloses having any foreign-denominated debt and zero otherwise, instead of the continuous debt 
variables. 
The relation between the ratio of R&D expenses to sales is significant only for users of 
forwards only and forwards combinations. The point estimate of the marginal probability for the 
choice of forwards only and forwards combinations (Choice 2) is positive and significant, while it 
is not reliably different from zero for the choice of swaps and swap combinations (Choice 1). If 
foreign sales are generally hedged with short-term currency derivatives such as forward contracts, 
then the greater significance of R&D related to forwards use is consistent with the argument 
presented in Section IV. As stated previously, a frrm might be exposed to foreign exchange-rate 
risk because of the mismatch between centralized R&D costs and foreign revenues (Lewent and 
Kearney, 1990). Because foreign revenues represent frequent and uncertain transactions, 
currency forwards are a more cost-effective alternative for dynamically hedging these revenues 
than currency swaps. 
The remaining results are generally consistent with those of the logit regressions. As 
Table VII reports, a frrm's quick ratio, a measure of a frrm 's short-term liquidity, is a significant 
and negative determinant of both choices of currency derivatives. Larger firms and frrms that use 
other derivatives are also more likely to use both classes of currency derivatives. However, the 
association between SIZE and forwards use is significantly lower than that between SIZE and 
swaps use at the 3 percent level. As in Section IV, the positive marginal probabilities suggest that 
economies of scale in implementing and maintaining a derivatives strategy are important 
determinants of currency derivatives use. 
The MNL regressions offer conflicting evidence on the importance of managerial 
incentives for derivatives use. As Table VII reports, the coefficient estimate on managerial wealth 
is not statistically different from zero for forwards use (Choice 2). However, managerial wealth is 
a negative and marginally significant determinant of swaps use (Choice 1). These results are 
contrary to the prediction of Smith andHulz ( 1985). 
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The coefficient estimate of managerial option ownership, while insignificant for Choice 1, 
is positive and significant for Choice 2. This indicates that fnms with higher option ownership are 
more likely to use forwards only or forwards combinations than swaps. This positive relation 
does not support Smith and Stulz' (1985) managerial contracting cost explanation for hedging, 
which predicts a negative relation between managerial option holdings and derivatives use if 
derivatives are used for hedging. One possible explanation for this positive relation is the 
observed positive association between the use of options in managerial compensation contracts 
and a fum's involvement in research and development activities (Clinch, 1991 ). In the case of 
fnms with long-term investment projects like R&D, managerial options align the incentives of 
risk-averse mangers with those of shareholders. High R&D firms are the same fnms for which 
forwards are the low cost alternative for hedging the mismatch between foreign revenues and 
R&D costs (Lewent and Kearney, 1990). 
Finally, standardized analyst following is significantly and positively associated with the 
use of forwards only, or forwards in combination with futures or options. As with the logit 
results, this positive association is not consistent with the DeMarzo and Duffie (1991) information 
argument for optimal hedging. 
VI. Conclusions 
In this paper, we examine the determinants of corporate use of currency derivatives from 
the perspectives of managers, debtholders, and equityholders. The results of univariate and 
multivariate tests ofthe differences between currency derivatives users and non-users indicate that 
firms with a combination of high growth opportunities but low accessibility to internal and 
external fmancing are most likely to use currency derivatives. This result is consistent with the 
hypothesis that hedging can reduce underinvestment costs associated with investment 
opportunities in the presence of fmancial constraints. Currency derivatives user fums, which are 
generally larger than non-users, are further characterized by greater analyst following and 
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institutional ownership, and greater managerial option holdings. These two groups of fums are 
similar in their tax positions and in managerial share ownership. 
We also consider how a fum's exposure to foreign exchange-rate risk affects the potential 
benefits of using currency derivatives and the costs of implementing a specific derivatives 
strategy. We find that firm characteristics related to these costs and benefits are related to the 
general decision to use currency derivatives and the specific choice among various types of 
currency instruments. We take these results to indicate that our sample fums are hedging, and not 
speculating, on average. 
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Appendix 
This appendix provides a summary of all explanatory variables used in our analysis and a detailed 
description of the method of calculation. The explanatory variables are generally constructed as 
follows : Flow variables are measured during the year of derivatives use (1991), and stock 
variables are measured at the beginning of the year (ftscal year end 1990). Implicit in this 
construction are two assumptions: First, decisions to use derivatives (measured at ftscal year end 
1991) are based on information available to the ftrm during 1991; second, actual flows in 1991 are 
the best proxy for management's expectations of 1991. Flow variables for 1990, however, may be 
a better proxy for management's expectations depending on the timing of the flow, the timing of 
the decision to use derivatives, and the degree to which management uses past performance to 
estimate future flows. 
Variable Name Variable Description 
ANLST The number of analyst ftrms covering a company as of September/October 1990, 
according to Nelson 's Directory of Investment Research. Alternatively, ANLST 
is measured as the number of analysts, rather than firms, following each sample 
ftrm. The results are qualitatively similar using both specifications of ANLST, so 
we present only those based on the number offtrms. 
BM Ratio of book to market value of the firm. Book value of common shareholders' 
equity as of the end of ftscal year 1990 is total assets less total liabilities less 
outstanding preferred stock (Compustat data items 6, 181, and 130, 
respectively). Market value is closing share price times common shares 
outstanding at year-end 1990 Compustat data items 199 and 25, respectively). 
CONV Ratio of book value of total convertible debt as of ftscal year-end 1990 
(Compustat data item 79) to SIZE. 
cova Interest coverage ratio. Ratio of pretax income for 1991 (Compustat data item 
170) plus interest expense for 1991 (Compustat data item 15) to interest expense 
plus capitalized interest (::ompustat data item 239) for 1991. 
DEa Long-term debt ratio. Ratio of book value of long-term debt as of the end of 
fiscal year 1990 (::ompustat data items 34 plus 9) to SIZE. 
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DIVa Dividend yield. Ratio of cash dividend per share in 1991 (Compustat data item 
26) to closing price per share as of fiscal year-end 1990 (Compustat data item 
199). 
Variable Name Variable Description 










An indicator variable equal to one if the firm has either non-zero L TFRDT or 
STFRDT or qualitatively discusses the existence of foreign-denominated debt in 
its fiscal year-end 1990 annual report. 
Ratio of pretax income from the firm's foreign operations (Compustat data item 
273) to sales (Compustat data item 12). 
Ratio of foreign sales plus export sales for the year ended 1991 (annual report) 
to sales (Compustat data item 12). 
The percentage of imports to total production (domestic production plus 
imports) as of December 31, 1991. These data are reported by the Department 
of Commerce for 4-digit SIC codes and matched to the sample based on 
Compustat dnums. Where 4-digit dnums are not available, we obtain 4-digit 
industry classifications from the 1991 annual report. 
The percentage of the finn's common shares outstanding held by institutional 
owners at fiscal year-end 1990 as reported by Nelson's Directory of Investment 
Research. Institutional investors include banks, brokerage firms, investment 
managers, insurance companies, mutual funds, and pension funds. Similar results 
related to institutional ownership are obtained using figures reported by Business 
Week and O 'Neil Database. 
The long-term and current portion of debt issued with an original maturity 
greater than one year, denominated in a currency other than US dollars (annual 
report) at year-end 1990. 
Market value of common shares beneficially owned (excluding shares that can be 
obtained within 60 days through the exercise of options) by officers and directors 
as a group as of fiscal year-end 1990 reporting date (Compact Disclosure, proxy 
statements, and 10-K filings). 
The portion of prior and current year net operating losses applied as a reduction 
of taxable income in 1990 (Compustat data item 52) scaled by total assets 
(Compustat data item 6). The book value of NOL is only reported on Compustat 
if it appears in the firm's tax footnote. When net operating loss carryforwards 
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are missing, we examine the ftnn's annual reports and 10-Ks to determine the 
book value of NOL if available, or the tax value of net operating loss 
carryforw ards if the book value is unavailable. 
OPTS The log of the market value of shares that can be obtained by exercise of options. 
The options areexercisable within 60 days of the reporting date for common 
shares beneficially owned by offices and directors as a group (Compact 
Disclosure, proxy statements, and 10-K filings). 
OTHDERIV An indicator variable equal to one if the fmn discloses using either interest-rate-
based or commodity-based derivative instruments; equal to zero otherwise. 
Variable Name Variable Description 
PPE Intensity of capital investment. Ratio of property, plant, and equipment at year-
end 1990 (Compustat data item 187) to SIZE. 
PS Ratio of book value of total preferred stock as of the end of fiscal year 1990 
(Compustat data item 130) to SIZE. 
QUICKa Quick ratio. Ratio of cash and short-term investments as of ftscal year-end 1990 
(Compustat data item 1) to current liabilities as of fiscal year-end 1990 
(Compustat data items 34, 70, 71, and 72). 
RD Ratio of R&D expenses during 1991 (Compustat data item 46) to sales 
(Compustat data item 12). 
SIZE Market value of the ftrm at fiscal year-end 1990. Natural logarithm of the sum 
of the market value of equity (Compustat data item 199 times Compustat data 
item 25), book value of long-term debt (Compustat data items 9 and 34), and 
book value of preferred stock (:om pus tat data item 130). 
STFRDT Debt issued with an original maturity less than one year denominated m a 
currency other than U .S. dollars (annual report) at year-end 1990. 
acov _AV, DE_AV, DIV _AV, and QUICK_AV are computed as three-year averages of COV, 
DE, DIV, and QUICK, respectively. 
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Table I 
Predicted Signs of C oefficient Estima tes 
Predicted signs of coefficient estimates for variables used as proxies for incentives to use foreign currency 
derivatives based on the testable implications of Smith and Stulz (1985, S&S), Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993, 
FSS) and DeMarzo and Duffie (1991, D&D). "D" refers to a direct prediction of a model; "I" refers to an indirect 
prediction. "NA" indicates that the independent v ariable is not applicable to a particular m odel. "?" indicates that 
the predicted sign is indeterminate. Variable names appear in the second column. Predicted signs appear in the 
thi d th h fi fth 1 r rougJ 1 co umns. 
Prediction 
S&S (1985) FSS (1 993) D&D (1 991) 
Independent Variables Variable Name 
M anagers 
Managerial wealth MGRWLTH +, D NA NA 
Managerial option ownership OPTS -, D NA NA 
Bon dholders 
Interest cov erage ratio COV AV -, D -, D NA 
Long-term debt ratio DE AV +, D +, D NA 
R&D expenses/sales RD +, I +,D +,I 
Plant, property, and equipment PPE +, I +, D +, I 
investment expenditures/SIZE 
Book -to-market ratio BM -, I -, D -, I 
Subs titu tes f or off-balance sh eet assets 
Convertible debt /SIZE CONV -, I +,I NA 
Preferred stock/SIZE PS -, I +, I NA 
Quick ratio QUICK_AV -, I -, D NA 
Dividend yield DIV AV +, I +, I NA 
E qu ityh olders 
Tax-loss carryforwards/total assets NOL +, D -, I NA 
Institutional ownership IO NA NA -, D 
Number of analyst firms ANLST NA NA -, D 
Firm Size SIZE ? ? -, I 
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T able II 
F r equ ency of U se of Derivative In struments by Size an d Indu str y 
Frequency of use o f derivative instruments by 372 large U. S. firms for fiscal year-end 1991 that have foreign 
exchange rate exposure as of fiscal year-end 1990. Companies are among the 500 largest firms (by sales) in the 
F ortune 500. A firm has foreign exchange rate exposure if it has non-zero foreign pretax income, positiv e foreign 
sales or debt, or is in the upper quartile of the sample firms on the basis o f imports as a percentage of total industry 
sales. Currency D erivatives include currency sw aps and foreign exchange forwards, futures and options. Any 
D erivatives include interest rate, commodity, and currency derivatives. All data on derivatives use are from annual 
reports and 10-K disclosures. The 1st quartile for firm size includes the smallest firms based on 1990 sales; the 
4th quartile includes the larg est firms. 
Currency Any 
N Derivatives Derivatives 
All Firms 372 41.4% 59.1% 
Panel A : By firm size (by 1990 sales} 
4th quartile 93 75.3 90.3 
3rd quartile 93 38.7 64.5 
2nd quartile 93 34.4 48.4 
1st quartile 93 17.2 33.3 
Panel B: By Fortune's industry grouping 
Consumer Goods 47 66.0% 78.7% 
Bevera_ges 6 83.3 100.0 
Food 22 59.1 81.8 
Phannaceuticals 14 85.7 85.7 
Tobacco 5 20.0 20.0 
Electronics 71 56.3% 63. 4% 
Computers office equipment 18 83.3 88.9 
Electronics, electrical equipment 35 42.9 48.6 
Scientific, photographic, and control equipmen 18 55.6 66.7 
Energy 32 34.4% 68.8% 
Mining, crude oil production 12 8.3 58.3 
Petroleum refinin_g 20 50.0 75.0 
Metals 32 21.9% 50.0% 
Jewelry, silverware 1 0.0 0.0 
Metal products 19 21.1 47.4 
Metals 12 25.0 58.3 
N on-durable consumer p roducts 35 28.6% 42.8% 
Apparel 11 27.3 36.4 
Furniture 5 0.0 20.0 
Soaps cosmetics 11 36.4 36.4 
Textiles 6 16.7 16.7 
Toys sporting goods 2 100.0 100.0 
Pap er 41 17.1% 39.0% 
Forest and paper products 27 18.5 44.4 
Publishin_g, printin_g 14 14.3 28.6 
Production materials 50 44.0% 62.0% 
Building materials glass 7 57.1 100.0 
Chemicals 33 42.4 57.6 
Rubber and plastic products 10 40.0 50.0 
Transportation 64 40.6% 59.4% 
Aerospace 16 12.5 43.8 
Industrial and fann equipment 32 53.1 65.6 
Motor vehicles and parts 13 38.5 53.8 
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Transportation equipment 3 66.7 100.0 
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Table III 
Summary of Financial Characteristics of Currency Derivative Users and No:hlsers 
Selected summary statistics for managerial and financial characteristics for firms that disclose the use of currency derivative 
instruments (currency derivative users), and firms that do not (currency derivative non-users) for 372 largeU.S. firms with 
foreign exchange rate exposure. Companies are among the 500 largest firms (by sales) in theFortune 500. A firm has foreign 
exchange rate exposure if it has non-zero foreign pretax income, positive foreign sales or debt, or is in the upper quartile of the 
sample firms on the basis of imports as a percentage of total industry sales. Panel A reports summary statistics for proxies 
related to incentives for hedging. Panel B reports summary statistics for proxies forforeign exchange exposure . All data are 
measured as of fiscal year-ends . In the cases of missing data, the number of observations are given in parentheses. t-statistics 
are given for tests of the equality of means between currency derivative users and non-users. p-values are in parentheses. 
Currency Derivative Users Currency Derivative Non t-
(N = 154) Users ~tatistic 
(N = 2 18) a 
Variable M ean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. (p-
Dev . value) 
IP anel A : Incentives for hedging 
M anagerial wealth $8.23 $8.02 $1.64 $7.93 $7.86 $1.79 -1.60 
(log $MM) I (N = 141) I(N = 203 (0.11) 
M anagerial option 7.45 7.60 1.47 6.46 6.50 1.37 -5.97 
ownership (N = 131) (N = 169 (0.00) 
(log $MM) 
Interest coverage rati 7.96 4.43 17.00 10.56 3.82 41.78 0.819 
(N = 152) (N = 2 13 (0.41) 
Long-term debt ratio 0.28 0.22 0.20 0.31 0.31 0.20 1.71 
I(N = 2 14 (0.09) 
R&D expenses/sales 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 -5.58 
(N = 136) (N = 133 (0.00) 
Plant, property, and 0.35 0.29 0.23 0.41 0.34 0.28 2.24 
equipment investmen (0.03) 
expenditures/SIZE 
Book-to-market ratio 0.52 0.51 0.53 0.70 0.61 0.56 3.20 
(0.00) 
Convertible debt!SIZ ~ 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.98 
I (N = 150) ICN = 2 16 (0.33) 
Preferred stock/SIZE 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.04 1.29 
(0.20) 
Quick ratio 0.25 0.15 0.29 0.35 0.19 0.79 1.73 
I (N = 153) (0.08) 
Dividend yield 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.28 
ICN = 2 14 (0.78) 
Tax-loss 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.07 -0.26 
carryforwards I (N = 153) (N = 213 (0.80) 
total assets 
Institutional 55.46 58.3 14.70 48.59 52 16.67 -4.05 
ownership (N = 152) (N = 205 (0.00) 
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Number of analyst 26.16 25 13.14 15.43 14 9.37 -8.65 
firms (N = 211 (0.00) 
Firm SIZE $8.24 $8.26 $1.41 $7.13 $7.13 $1.01 -8.33 
(log $MM) ICN = 217 (0.00) 
IPanel B: Foreign exchange exposure 
Pretax foreign incom 0.033 0.027 0.035 0.018 0.008 0.039 -3.70 
I total sales ICN = 149) ICN = 162 (0.00) 
Foreign & export 0.389 0.376 0.195 0.282 0.228 0.241 -4.10 
sales I (N = 141) (N = 141 (0.00) 
total sales 
Identifiable foreign 0.346 0.316 0.205 0.350 0.240 0.313 0.12 
assets I total asseh (N = 138) (N = 116 (0.91) 
Foreign long-term 0.023 0.001 0.045 0.005 0 0.014 -4.81 
debt / total asset! I (N = 153) ICN = 216 (0.00) 
Foreign short-term 0.006 0 0.018 0.003 0 0.013 -1.85 
debt / total asset I (N = 153) ICN = 216 (0.07) 
Percentage of import 16.35% 12% 14.37% 12.03% 10% 11.05% -3.13 
in 4-digit SIC industr f,r (0.00) 
at-tests assume equal variances unless the null hypothesis of equal variances is rejected at a 10% significance level. 
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Table I V 
Logit Regression Estimates of the Lik elihood ofUsing C urrency Derivatives 
Logit regression estimates of the relation between the likelihood that a firm uses currency derivatives and proxies for incentives 
to use derivatives, proxies for foreign exchange exposure, and Fortune industry indicator variables for large U.S. fiilTls that 
have foreign exchange rate exposure as of fiscal year-end 1990. Companies are among the 500 largest firms (by sales) in the 
Fortune 500. A firm has foreign exchange rate exposure if it has non-zero foreign pretax income, positive foreign sales or debt, 
or is in the upper quartile of the sample firms on the basis of imports as a percentage of total industry sales. The second 
through fourth columns present the signs of the coefficient estimates based on the testable implications of Smith andStulz 
(1985, S&S), Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993, FSS), and DeMarzo and Duffie (1991, D&D). The full sample of 282 firms 
does not use the ratio of research and developmentexpenses to sales (R&D) and contains firms for which all data is available. 
The partial sample of 220 firms contains firms with R&D data. iJ.Prob. measures the marginal change in the probability of 
using derivatives resulting from a change in the independent variable. The marginal effects of the regressors on the 
probabilities are calculated as: a I a =A -A , where y = dichotomous dependent variable; Xi = ith 
independent variable; x = vector of independent variables; A = the logistic cumulative distribution function; andz = vector of 
coefficient estimates. a I a is calculated at the means of the regressors. t-statistics are for the logit coefficients. Summary 
statistics for thelogit regression are presented in Panel B 
P l A L ane t og1.1 regresswn es nn a es 
Full Sample Partial Sample: RD Available 
Predicted Sign: (N = 282) eN = 220\ 
V ariable S&S FSS D&D Coeff. !1 Prob. t-stat. Coeff. !1 Prob. t-stat. 
Constant NA NA NA 
-4.6341 -1.154 -2.709 -6.3591 -1.550 -3.094 
Managerial wealth + NA NA 0.018 0.004 0.156 0.045 0.011 0.333 
Managerial option ownership - NA NA 0.062 0.016 0.916 0.107 0.026 1.2 16 
Tax-loss carryforwards/ + - NA 0.401 0. 100 0.174 2.992 0.729 1.307 
total assets 
Long-term debt ratio OE AV) + + NA -1.416 -0.353 -1.172 0.132 0.032 0.086 
Book-to-market ratio if3M_) - - - -0.052 -0.013 -0.109 - - -
DE_AV*(lA3M) + + + 0.56110 0. 140 1.854 - - -
R&D expenses/sales (RD) + + + - - - 28.6101 6.976 2.466 
DE AV*(RD) + + + - - - -43.603 -10.632 -1.2 14 
Quick ratio - - NA -0.919 -0.229 -1.541 
-1.921 1 -0.468 -2.497 
Number of analyst firms NA NA - 0.0661 0.016 2.606 0.047 0.0 11 1.432 
Firm size ? ? - 0.7261 0.181 4.380 0.6001 0.146 3.087 
Pretax foreign income/ + 8.67 110 2. 159 1.745 15.5275 3.786 2.028 
total sales 
Firm has foreign denominated ? 0.7765 0.193 2.434 1.2391 0.302 3.086 
debt 
Percentage of imports in 4-digit + 0.0531 0.013 3.591 0.0601 0.015 3.356 
S IC industry 
Firm uses other derivatives ? 0.7365 0.183 2.068 1.3071 0.319 2.898 
Industry Indicator Variables: 
Conswner Goods ? 0.572 0.142 0.857 1.230 0.300 1.421 
Electronics ? - - - - - -
Energy ? 
-1.4955 -0.372 -2. 116 -0.025 -0.606 -0.022 
Metals ? -0 .503 -0.125 -0.723 0.707 0.172 0.803 
N on-Durable Cons. Goods ? -0.264 -0.263 -0.396 0.517 0.126 0.554 
Paper ? -0.822 -0.205 -1.294 -0.3 19 -0.078 -0.381 
Production Materials ? 0.466 0. 116 0.829 1.049 0.226 1.573 
TrariSportation ? 0.296 0.074 0.592 0.615 0.150 1.063 
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T able IV (continued) 
P 1 B S ane urnrnarv St t t f, L 't R a I S l CS or Ogll egresswns 
Full Sample Partial Sample 
Number of Observations Predicted Dependent Variable: Predicted Dependent Variable: 
Actual Dependent Variable: 0 1 Total 0 1 Total 
0 (Discloses no use of currency 117 31 148 77 24 101 
derivatives) 
1 (Discloses use of currency derivatives) 39 95 134 25 94 119 
Total 156 126 282 102 118 220 
Log Likelihood at convergence -132.41 -95.72 
Restricted Log Likelihood: Slopes = 0 -195.1 2 -151.76 
-2*(Log Likelihood Ratio)/(degrees of freedom) 125.411(20 112.08/(20) 
1 (5) {10lsignificant at the 1% (5%) {10%} significance level for a two-tailed test. 
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Table VI 
Frequency of Use of Foreign C urrency Derivative Instrum ents by Instrument Type 
Frequency of use of selected foreign currency derivative instruments by 372 large U.S. industrial firms that have 
foreign ex change rate exposure as of fiscal year-end 1990. Companies are among the 500 largest firms (by sales) 
in the Fortune 500. A firm has foreign exchange rate exposure if it has nonzero foreign pretax income, positiv e 
foreign sales or debt, or is in the upper quartile of the sample firms on the basis of imports as a percentage of total 
industry sales. Panel A reports the frequency of use of different types of foreign currency derivatives for all firms. 
Panel B reports the frequency of derivatives use by type of foreign exchange rate exposure. N one of the means of 
the proxy variables are significantly different across the choice between "Currency swaps and swap combinations" 
and "Currency forwards and forward combinations." t-tests assume equal variances unless the null hypothesis of 
equal variances is rejected at a 10% significance level. 
Panel A: Derivative instrument choice 
N o currency Currency swaps and Currency forwards and 
instrument swap combinations forward combinations Total 
N 2 18 45 109 372 
% 58. 6 12.1 29.3 100.0 
PanelB: Exposure to operating, financing, and competitive risk by derivative instrument choice 
N o currency Currency swaps and Currency forwards and 
instrument swap combinations forward combinations Total 
N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
Operations: 
Foreign pretax 165 0 .0 171 44 0 .029Ql0 105 0 .034& 314 
income/ total sale 
Foreign & export 14 1 0 .2824 42 0 .387g; 99 0 .39021 282 
sales/total sales 
Identifiable 116 0 .3505 39 0.3548 99 0 .3432 254 
foreign assets/ 
total assets 
For eign debt: 
Foreign long-tern 
debt /total assets 41 0 .0258 36 0.05435 43 0 .0361 120 
Foreign short-terr 
debt/ total 25 0 .0281 10 0 .0255 22 0 .0328 57 
assets 
Competitive: 
Percentage of 2 18 12.03% 45 14.24% 109 17.22%1 372 
imports in 4-digit 
SIC industry 
1 (5) {lO}Significantly different from the choice of no currency instrument at the 1 (5) { 10} % level, respectively. 
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T able V 
Pear son Correlation Coefficients 
Pearson correlation coefficients for explanatory variables used in the logit and multinomial logit regressions 
(expressed in percentages). Variables are as follows: NOL is tax-loss carryforwards scaled by total assets. 
COV _A V is interest coverage ratio. DE_ AVis long-term debt ratio. SIZE is log of firm size. MG RWL TH is log 
of the marl<:et value of common shares beneficially owned (excluding options) by officers and directors as a group. 
OPTS is log of the marl<:et value of managerial option ownership. RD is the ratio research and development 
expenses to total sales. PPE is the ratio of plant, property, and equipment inv estment expenditures to SIZE. BM is 
the book to market ratio. CONY is the ratio of convertible debt to SIZE. PS is the ratio of preferred stock to SIZE. 
QUICK_ A V is the quick ratio. DIV _A V is the dividend yield. 10 is institutional ownership. ANLST is number 
of analyst firms. 
NOL COV AV DE AV SIZE MGRWLTI- OPTS RD PPE BM CONY 
COV AV -6.2% 
DE AV 14.d -24.71 
SIZE 
-1 1.75 0 .7 -7 .3 
MGRWLTH 
-1 4.51 2 1.31 -33.91 31.61 
OPTS -1.8 2.4 
-13.15 36.91 3 .1 
RD 11.410 2.2 
-32.41 11.85 11.3 15.35 
PPE 8. i 0 -7.5 32.91 -5.1 -30.31 -9.310 -23.51 
BM 0.0 
-9 . 110 36.51 -19.21 -23.31 
-13.25 -6.5 40.01 
CON Y 27.11 -6.8 17.91 -17.01 -8.5 -4.0 11.410 5 .4 15.21 
PS 16.81 -5.2 14.91 -3.5 -22.91 -9.610 -1.4 20.31 7. 1 -4.3 
QUICK_AV 3.7 11.35 -20.91 3.4 21 .71 -12.55 30.31 -1 5.61 -1.4 5.2 
DIV A V -6.7 6 .5 2 1.41 -3.3 -10.75 -7.6 -1 4.0S 4.0 -34.41 -6.7 
IO 
-1 1. 15 -9 .010 -24.d 15.71 -11.45 25.i 27.51 -5 .6 -4.6 -1 5.71 
ANLST -5.3 0 .2 
-19.81 8 1.41 22.01 41.91 32.61 4.3 -1 5.61 -1 r.SS 







T a ble VII 
M ultinomial Logit E stimates ofthe Lik elihood of Using Different Classes of Currency Derivativ es 
Multinomial logit estimates of the relation between the likelihood that a finn chooses one of two categories of derivative 
strategies and variables measuring hedging incentives in fiscal year 199 1 for 220 largeU.S. industrial firms with foreign 
exchange rate exposure. This sample represents all finns that have research and development (R&D) expense data. 
Companies are among the 500 largest firms (by sales) in theFortune 500. A finn has foreign exchange rate exposure if it has 
nonzero foreign pretax income, positive foreign sales or debt, or is in the upper quartile of the sample finns on the basis of 
imports as a percentage of total industry sales (i.e., high import competition). Classes of currency derivatives choices presented 
in the table are expressed relative to the choice of not using currency derivatives. Choice 1 refers to using currency swaps only 
or currency swaps in combination with forwards, futures and options (Swaps Only and Swap Combinations). Choice 2 refers to 
using foreign exchange forwards only or using foreign exchange forwards in combination with foreign exchange futures or 
options (Forwards Only and Forward Combinations). i1Prob. measures the marginal change in the probability of making 
Choice 1 or Choice 2 resulting from a change in the independent variable, calculated at the means of theregressors. The t-
statistics are for the coefficient estimates. SlllTlmary statistics for themultinominallogit regressions are presented in Panel B. 
1 . . 1 Pane A: Mu tmom1a Log1t Estrmates 
Derivative Instrument Choice 
Choice 1 
Swaps Only and Swap Combinations Forwards Only a1 
(N =35) 
Coefficient f.Prob t-statistic Coefficient 
Constant -10.0011 -0.623 -3.296 -3.68610 
Managerial wealth -0.337 -0.029 -1.573 0 .098 
Managerial option ownership -0.098 -0.016 -0 .996 0 .22SS 
Tax loss carry forwards/total assets 0.538 -0.045 0 .099 2 .245 
Long-term debt ratio -3 .96310 -0.306 -1.672 0 .088 
R&D expensesfotal sales 12.50 1 -0.036 0 .816 25.9615 
Long-term debt ratio * R&D expenses 7.157 1.778 0 .128 -32.3 14 
Quick ratio -2.8865 -0.148 -2.05 1 -1.90510 
Analyst firms -0.020 -0.004 -0.479 0 .05510 
Firm size 1.1841 0.075 3 .933 0 .39i 0 
Foreign pretax income/total sales 21.3385 0.955 1.926 17.65g5 
Long-term foreign debt /total assets 0.000 -0.000 0 .408 0 .00 1 
Short-term foreign debt/total assets -0.002 -0.000 -0.617 -0 .002 
Firm has high import competition 0.0565 0.003 2 .318 0.04d 
Firm uses other derivatives 2.2151 0.139 3.403 0 .78i 0 
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Panel B. Summary Statistics for Mu ltinomialLogit Regression 
Number of Observations Predicted Dependent Va 
A ctual Dependent Variable: 0 1 2 
0 (Does not disclose the use of currency derivatives) 83 4 14 
1 (Discloses using currency swaps only or currency swap 7 18 10 
combinations) 
2 (Discloses using forwards only or forwards combinations) 25 8 51 
Total 115 30 75 
Log Likelihood at convergence -151.57 
Restricted Log Likelihood: Slopes = 0 -223.85 
-2 *(Log Likelihood Ratio)/(degrees of freedom) 144.55/(28) 
1 (5) {10 }Significant at the 1% (5%) { 10%} significance level for a two-tailed test. 
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Endnotes 
See, for example, Smith and>tulz ( 1985) andFroot, Scharfstein, and Stein ( 1993 ). 
1Breeden and Viswanathan (1996) and DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) develop models in which 
managerial reputation provides incentives for managers to use derivatives. Using our sample, 
specific testable implications of the these models are difficult to implement. 
2Financial statement amounts include the effects of interest rate derivative products. Therefore, 
COV _A V and DE_ A V measure post derivative-use coverage and leverage, respectively. This 
measurement may overstate or understate pre-hedging exposure to financial distress. Our 
preferred measure of COV _A V is unhedged interest expense; our preferred measure of DE_ A V 
is the av erage market v alue of debt. Neither of these measures, however, is available. 
3Expected taxes and the expected availability of internal cash flows are negatively related. 
Consequently, decreasing expected taxes indirectly increases the availability of internal funds. We 
interpret the FSS model to imply that firms facing a convex tax function will hedge less, ceteris 
p aribus. 
4Following the Nance et al. procedure, we classify 55 percent of our sample fmns as having a high 
probability of operating in the progressive tax region. None of the firms, however, realize income 
subject to a progressive tax. 
5Translation adjustments on assets and liabilities in place or transaction gains and losses represent 
the ex post impact of currency value changes, not the total dollars at risk. These data are 
av ailable only for a limited number of firms in our sample (145 observations). 
6These data are collected by reading segment-reporting footnotes and other disclosures within the 
annual report. We also include export sales when disclosed. 
7There are only three ftrms with foreign exchange-rate exposure based only on IIVIPORTS. To 
check the robustness of our results to our competitive exposure classification, we also include 
fmns with IMPORTS greater than the median. This results in 18 additional sample firms but does 
not change the empirical results. 
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80nly two firms have foreign-denominated debt but no operating exposure. Neither fum discloses 
using currency derivatives . 
9W e also estimate the logit regresswns without industry indicator variables because of the 
potential overlap between II'v1PORTS, which is based on the four-digit SIC classification, and the 
industry indicator variables that are based on Fortune 's industry classifications. The results are 
qualitatively similar, except that DE_ A V is negative and significant at the 10 percent significance 
level for the full sample. 
1<Due to high correlations between analyst following and fum stze, and managerial option 
ownership and fum size (see Table V), we use the residuals from a separate regression of each 
variable on SIZE, standardized by its predicted value, as a measure of analyst following and 
managerial option ownership, respectively, in the logit regression. In addition, where other 
independent variables are highly correlated we test the joint significance of groups of coefficients. 
Based on these F-tests, the conclusions are unchanged. 
11We thank Michaell3rennan for suggesting this alternative explanation. 
12See, for example, Titman (1992) and Minton (1994) for models in which the choice of interest 
rate derivatives use is made simultaneously with the choice of the type of debt fmancing. See 
Kim and Titman (1996) for a discussion about the choice of managerial compensation structure 
and derivatives use. 
13G ilson (1989), andGilson andVetsuypens ( 1993) find evidence that managerial tenure and 
compensation is affected by financial distress. 
14 The multinomiallogit regressions presented in Section V also are subject to this criticism. For 
these regressions, we perform robustness checks of our variable specification similar to those 
discussed here, and the results are qualitativ ely similar 
15See Titman (1992) andMinton (1994) for models examining capital structure choice in the 
presence of interest-rate deriv ativ e instruments. 
16As a robustness check, we also estimate the model using BM as our measure of growth 
opportunities. The results, not presented, are qualitatively the same. 
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